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      I will address five key points:  1) we are at the nexus of tense coexistence 
of multiple eras of societal evolution and of disparate generations of our people; 
we must work together to solve several major national emergencies, not just 9-
11,  2) the role of the university is to create enduring value; we ensure this by 
being the fountain of really bold new thinking under a renewed social contract, 3) 
everyone loves a tax cut, but did Washington really misplace $5 trillion dollars, 
and what does it mean for science in the coming decade?  4) science and 
secrecy are polar opposites, and their growing tension needs resolution now,     
5) homeland security requires a new defense paradigm, a streamlined, high 
agility, increasingly competitive operational system and different sets of expertise 
to address prevention as well as mitigation.    
 
What Does it Mean to be at a Time of National Emergency? 
 
World leadership requires us to lead the world to a better tomorrow.  
Because of this, we are indeed in a time of national emergency, but not just a 
post 9-11 response.  There are several national emergencies in the United 
States today; they are all important and many interact.  Each one undermines our 
future and many challenge our right to lead.   
 
Here are some examples: 
 
¾ We repeatedly fail to plan and sustain an effort for sustainable energy 
autonomy.   
¾ Our children finish high school at the bottom of the world in math and 
science.  
¾ In many cities, a majority of births occur in one-parent families.   
¾ We squander unique opportunities provided by the last decade of 
economic growth.   
¾ Addicting street drugs and sexually transmitted diseases are runaway 
epidemics. 
¾ Our personal privacy and Constitutional rights are fast becoming historic 
relics. 
¾ Justly judged guilty and sentenced to death has become “oops, another 
mistake.” 
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¾ Half our citizens ignore all evidence and condemn the teaching of 
evolution as “heresy.”  
¾ Although the global standoff on whether we should annihilate all life on 
Earth has ended (Cold War), it has now evolved into perpetual tribal 
warfare, with us as the world’s policeman. 
¾ We overfish coastal areas, causing catastrophic eco-collapses, while 
invasive species remake or destroy our landscape, and limit its future 
productivity. 
¾ Fresh, clean water is moving from being a commodity to being a crisis and 
we despoil the air, the water, the land, to avoid the expense of converting 
the nation to sustainable systems, and thus severely limit the future of our 
children. 
¾ Networks of smart, resourceful, imaginative, impatient, fanatic murderers 
from the pre-industrial age devastate the infidels who dare to live happily 
in the post-industrial age. 
 
What is the Role of Universities? 
 
Society has problems, while universities have departments. Scientists 
need to be absorbed in many pressing issues, not just the latest problem of 
national security.  It is time for universities to assert their leadership. While all our 
institutions and commercial enterprises operate in the present, we, in contrast, 
are the constituency for the future. Many universities are giving up their most 
useful role – the perpetual stimulation of new ideas.  This is where breakthroughs 
happen.  Universities are becoming redirected as a temporary answer to today’s 
corporate R&D malaise, serving short-term profits. We should reach the pinnacle 
of our journey as universities by adding the maximum value to society.  Too often 
we confuse success with excellence, and stop along the way measuring proxies 
of value (e.g., awards, money, rankings) and then become arrested into the 
pursuit of these proxies instead of value. 
 
 We live in a period in which we have a contentious interaction of 
coexisting pre-agrarian, agrarian, newly industrializing, industrial and post-
industrial societies around the world. At the same time, we have colliding 
generations in the U.S. (named by Lynne Lancaster):  the traditionalists, baby 
boomers, generation-X and the new millennials – each shaped by a wholly 
different history and expressing a strongly held, very disparate, world view. Each 
appears confident that they are right, and the other folks will “see the light” as 
they have, in due time.  
 
 Thus we are at a time in which the universities are challenged to assert 
their leadership, to experiment with very new ideas, to lead – not follow – the 
evolution of our free society.  Adding one more national emergency, even this 
one, is never a time to fail in this obligation to our society; instead it makes the 
case for doing so even more compelling. 
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 Now is the time for each of you to build the intellectual underpinnings for 
the long-term capacity to be a free and just society. Each university should be 
pursuing a bold, imaginative, even startling research agenda. 
 
 This is the time to examine and clarify these questions: What should be 
the twenty-first-century social contract between society and universities?   
…between government and universities?  ….between industry and universities? 
….between virtual education and personal interaction? 
 
Contributions of Science 
 
What is the mission of the twenty-first century university? How do we 
define it? When will we put behind us the elements of the industrial revolution 
that no longer fit? When will we institute, and when should we begin to replace, 
the elements of the information society?  
 
Scientists need to develop and widely communicate the grand challenges 
of the twenty-first century.  All science is foundational.  From this foundation, we 
generate more new ideas and knowledge and can create new amenities.  
Scientists, in the everyday course of doing research and inquiring into Nature, 
create much change.  The ability to transplant genes, grow whole mammals from 
any cell nucleus, and hundreds of other discoveries, occur far more rapidly than 
the ability of our institutions to cope with the implications of the changes created. 
 
 Scientists have generated considerable value to the society. In the 
twentieth century we saw so many revolutions that they often overtook us.  A 
century ago, we did not imagine such advances as these, but they were 
achieved: 
 
¾ synthetic hormones and antibiotics  
¾ producing human insulin in bacteria 
¾ humans living in a space station far from earth 
¾ cracking the universal genetic code       
¾ conceiving a baby in a test tube 
¾ discovering lasers and NMR and using them as medical lifesavers 
¾ the transistor, personal computers  
¾ walking on the moon 
¾ conducting electricity without resistance 
¾ the Internet 
¾ storing an encyclopedia on a credit card 
¾ flying a jet across the ocean in 2 hours 
¾ live broadcasts by color TV from around the world in real time 
¾ transplanting hearts from the dead to the living 
¾ remote digital copiers and cell phones 
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 Scientists save lives, create jobs, and provide a unique workforce that can 
overtake our challenges.  Thus scientists are always a constituency for the 
future.  We live at the edge of knowledge and can have the thrill of stepping off 
into the unseen and the unknown – the future – every day.  We can envision the 
future we would like to create and it is exciting.  We will make important new 
discoveries that benefit humankind. We will create new sciences never thought of 
before.   
 
Grand Challenges of the Twenty-first Century 
 
Some overarching goals for our future are: 
 
¾ Discovering new truths of nature; 
¾ Enhancing the value of universities to society; 
¾ Converting the nation, even the world into entirely sustainable systems; 
¾ Developing all the human cognitive capabilities and potentials to learn; 
¾ Healthier lives, built on pre-emptive prevention, rather than treatment, of 
disease; 
¾ Stimulating our economic engines and inventing new economic paradigms 
that prosper without further population growth and environmental damage; 
¾ Developing affordable, sustainable, distributed, universal energy 
autonomy; 
¾ Understanding and fully developing affirmative and beneficial human 
behavior. 
 
Federal Resources 
 
The White House and the Congress told the American people last year 
that we would accumulate a $5 trillion surplus in the next decade and that we 
should pay down the debt and return one-third of it in tax cuts now. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) data projected that over the next decade we 
would spend $800 billion in interest on the National Debt, but then it would be 
fully paid off.   So we voted to cut taxes only to find out that it was not true, and 
we will be saddled with debt interest payments of $1.8 trillion over the next 
decade, and the debt will still be there, and the growing government debt is 
competing with business expansion for new capital. Last year’s Bush budget left 
no margin for error in forecasting the next decade of surpluses. If we look over 
the last four decades of deficits and surpluses, covering the Johnson, Nixon, 
Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush-I, Clinton and Bush-II eras, we find that war and 
defense were not the factors that produced the largest federal deficits; in the only 
two cases that the deficit spun out of control, the Reagan-Bush-I and Bush-II 
periods, it was from enacting a huge tax cut that was not required to be linked to 
actual federal revenue gains to prevent huge deficits.  
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2003 Federal Budget:  Revenues and Allocations 
 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003  
US GDP $9,745 ~$10,360 ~$10,920 
 
The burden of tax payments is not on corporations in America, but on us.  
 
2003 Federal Budget: Federal Revenues 
Tax Burden on Individuals:  $ in Billions  (all figures rounded) 
Individual income taxes 
Payroll taxes 
Excise taxes 
Estate taxes 
Miscellaneous 
1,100 
   720 
     75 
     30 
     45 
Tax Burden on Corporations:  
Corporate and profits 
Customs 
   220 
     25 
Total Federal Tax Revenues 2,050 
Notes from Martin Apple 
 
The non-defense appropriations are the only real discretion that the White House 
and Congress have in determining how the huge federal revenues are spent. 
 
Allocations of Proposed Federal Budget 
 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 estimate 
Federal Budget $1,865  $2,050 $2,130 ($ in billions) 
Tax Receipts   1,990    1,945   2,050 
Allocations: 
Entitlements  
(Medicare, Medicaid, 
Social Security) 
   
 
  1,056 
  
 
   1,189 
  
 
  1,233 
Debt Interest      206       178      181 
Discretionary - Total 
Defense 
Non-Defense 
     657 
     309 
     348 
      741 
      348 
      393 
     789 
     379 
     410 
Notes from Martin Apple 
 
Did Washington really lose $5 trillion of our planned surplus in less than 2 years? 
 
Ten Year Real Surplus (excluding social security) in Trillions of Dollars 
White House Report Date Projection  
for 2002-2011 
Update  
for 2003-2012 
April 2001 +$3.046 Trillion  
August 2001 +$0.575 Trillion  
February 2002 -$1.650 Trillion -$1.464 Trillion 
Data from OMB 
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When you manage to lose $5 trillion, it is quite appropriate to demand to 
know where it went. We all assume, based on the deliberate daily Washington 
press spin that it has gone into our new defense requirements.  But that turns out 
not to be the truth.  For example, analysis of the OMB’s own data shows that the 
big tax cut created about 45% of the new projected deficit already, the slowing 
economy accounted for about 25-30%, and all other legislative actions – 
including all defense buildups – accounted for only about 15-17% of the deficit.   
 
Historical Defense Buildups as Percents of GDP 
 
Buildup Episode Prior Low Buildup Peak Increase 
World War II 1.7% (1940) 37.9% (1944) 36.2% 
Korea 3.6% (1948) 14.1% (1953) 10.5% 
Vietnam 7.4% (1965)  9.4% (1968)  2.0% 
Reagan 4.6% (1979)  6.2% (1986)  1.6% 
Current 3.0% (2001)  3.5% (2003)  0.5% 
Prepared by the staff of the House Budget Committee                     Source: OMB 2/26/02 
 
In addition, we see a growing squeeze on discretionary spending. 
 
High Growth Sectors are Increasingly Squeezing the Federal Budget 
($ billion) 
Federal Outlays 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 est. 
Entitlements $61 $262 $568 $951 $1159 
Defense $82 $135 $300 $295 $  379 
 
Projected for FY 2003 Federal Science and Technology 
[Discovery of new knowledge] 
Proposed Budget - $billions 
AGENCY FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 
NIH $20.4 $23.4 $27.3 
NASA     7.8     8.1     8.7 
Energy     4.9     5.1     5.0 
Defense      4.9     4.9     4.9 
NSF     4.4     4.8     5.0 
Agriculture (+USFS)     1.9     1.9     1.9 
Commerce 
(OAR+NOAA+NIST) 
    0.8     1.0     0.9 
Interior     0.9     0.9     0.9 
EPA     0.7     0.7     0.8 
Transportation     0.5     0.7     0.5 
Education     0.3     0.4     0.4 
TOTAL $48.1 $52.3 $57.0 
Not adjusted for inflation    
Notes from Martin Apple 
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Federal Research Trends (NAS and NSF Data) 
 
The 1990s economy prospered, the 1990s federal budget surplus was 
generated, but… 
 
 
Fields with Severe Funding Cuts since 1993 
 
Academic Disciplines 1993-1997 Academic Disciplines 1993-1999 
Physics -27.8% Physics -24.6% 
Electrical Engineering -35.0% Chemical Engineering -25.9% 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
-49.8% Electrical Engineering -29.0% 
Geology -20.1% Mechanical 
Engineering 
-53.9% 
Agriculture Sciences -17.1% Geology -25.9% 
 
 
Full Time Graduate Students in many Key Sciences has Declined 
(data from NAS study ) 
 
FIELD OF RESEARCH 1993 1999 % Change 
Physics    
Graduate Students 12,397 9,661 -22.1% 
Federally Supported Graduate Students  4,916 3,807 -22.6% 
Federally Supported Research Assistants  4,103 3,248 -20.8% 
Geosciences    
Graduate Students  5,970 5,239 -12.2% 
Federally Supported Graduate Students  1,647 1,263 -23.3% 
Federally Supported Research Assistants  1,338 1,040 -22.3% 
Ocean Sciences    
Graduate Students  2,177 2,130 -  2.2% 
Federally Supported Graduate Students  1,037    932 -10.1% 
Federally Supported Research Assistants     865    788  - 8.9% 
Mathematical Sciences    
Graduate Students 14,530 11,792 -18.8% 
Federally Supported Graduate Students   1,474   1,104 -25.1% 
Federally Supported Research Assistants      736      594 -19.3% 
Materials Engineering    
Graduate Students  4,249  3,537 -16.8% 
Federally Supported Graduate Students  1,605  1,336 -16.8% 
Federally Supported Research Assistants  1,393  1,202 -13.7% 
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What Does This Portend for U.S. Science? 
 
New projections by the Bush Administration will have profound 
implications for our twenty-first century world leadership and the growth of 
scientific research. 
 
 
Preliminary Agency Projections 5 Years Ahead 
$ billions of constant dollars 
      
 
AGENCY FY 2002 %Change by FY 2007 
NIH $22.8 BN +16% (most of it this year) 
NASA   10.2 BN + 9%  (most of it this year) 
DOD (6.1+6.2+6.3)   10.0 BN + 9% 
Energy     8.4 BN  - 2% 
NSF     3.5 BN + 3% 
Agriculture     2.3 BN  - 7% 
Commerce     1.1 BN  - 1% 
Interior     0.7 BN  - 6% 
Transportation     0.8 BN  - 6% 
EPA     0.6 BN + 6% 
   
Non-DOD, minus NIH $26.9 BN + 1.6% 
Notes from Martin Apple 
 
Congressional research appropriations are concentrated into eight sub-
committees that make all discretionary financing decisions. The members of 
these subcommittees will decide soon. They need to hear from the science and 
university communities about the consequences. 
 
      
Subcommittee that Decides Total Spending  
($ billions) 
Research 
Investment 
Labor, HHS, Education $131BN $27.7 BN 
VA, HUD, Independent Agencies    93 BN   15.8 BN 
Defense (6.1+6.2+6.3)  360 BN   10.0 BN 
Energy and Water    25 BN     7.6 BN 
Agriculture    17 BN     2.0 BN 
Interior    20 BN     1.9 BN 
Commerce, Justice    41 BN     1.2 BN 
Transportation    20 BN     0.7 BN 
        Notes from Martin Apple 
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Why Do We Believe We Cannot Fall Behind in Crucial Leadership? 
  
Recent examples tell us a different story.  
                              
Supercomputers 
 
Year Fastest 
Computer 
Micro-
Processors,  
if used 
Number of 
processors 
Speed in 
Gigaflops* 
2002 NEC Earth 
Simulator 
   5,104 35,600 
2001 I.B.M. ASCI 
White-Pacific 
I.B.M. SP Power 3   7,424   7,226 
2000 I.B.M. ASCI 
White-Pacific 
I.B.M. SP Power 3   7,424   4,938 
1999 Intel ASCI Red Intel Pentium II 
Xion 
  9,632   2,379 
1998 I.B.M. ASCI 
Blue-Pacific 
I.B.M. SP 604E   5,808   2,144 
1997 Intel ASCI Option 
Red 
200 MHz Pentium 
Pro 
  9,152   1,338 
1996  Hitachi CP-PACS    2,048     368 
1995  Intel Paragon 
XP/S MP 
   6,768     281 
1994 Intel Paragon 
XP/S MP 
   6,768     281 
1993 Fujitsu NWT       140     124 
1992 NEC SX-3/44           4       20 
1991 Fujitsu 
VP2600/10 
          1         4 
* Billions of mathematical operations per second     
  Source: Jack Dongarra, Univ. of Tennessee 
 
 
The New National Crisis – Responding to 9-11:  Key Actions for Scientists  
 
 The most important challenge may not be eliminating the bad guys.  It 
may be preserving the freedoms and values we are trying to protect while we are 
doing so. 
 
Office of Homeland Security 
 
 It would be helpful to get the Office of Homeland Security organized in a 
way that shows practical streamlined functioning.  The official version does not 
lend itself to this.  It puts the cart before the horse – it first defines who will be 
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collected together, and then decides what they will do and when, by whom, etc. 
In the process, it leaves out crucial scientific and intelligence capabilities.  Here’s 
an example: if all on one day a major and different type of incident of terrorism 
occurs in a U.S. harbor, and a football stadium, and on three dozen farms, and at 
hub airports, and on a block of urban skyscrapers, and a senior official of each 
group named in the new HSO hierarchy were coincidental witnesses at each site, 
who would be in charge of the next five steps of action?  How would their actions 
be coordinated over the next hour? The next 24 hours? What is the plan of action 
they would follow? It is now nine months since 9-11 and no one seems to know 
the answer to this simple query.   Our defense strategy needs a new paradigm.  
Business as usual by the Department of Defense, the state governors, and local 
police is not likely to be optimally effective.  
 
 Here are the lessons taken from the twentieth-century wars around which 
we built the U.S. Department of Defense: 
 
1. Negotiated truces almost always fail and decisive military victories almost 
always redirect the future to the victors. 
2. Winners of wars are those who have the most surviving military people, 
the most weapons, and/or the most willingness to continue killing.  Losers 
lack one or more of the three. 
3. War requires both sides to protect, defend, or lose territory, and both 
opponents must live within those defined territories. 
4. Bigger is better – more troops, more tanks, more ships, more warheads; 
bigger guns, bigger tanks, bigger ships, more computer power, etc. 
5. Project enough force abroad and new wars will be prevented, or if they 
occur, they will be conducted on the enemy territory, not our homeland. 
 
I suggest we need these attributes for rethinking our new self-defense paradigm: 
 
¾ Decisive victories, not truces 
¾ Time is the enemy, not a friend 
¾ Agility, not hierarchy 
¾ Dispersion, not concentration 
¾ Brain, not brawn 
¾ Networks, not armies 
¾ Perpetual learning, not doctrines 
¾ Systems vulnerabilities, not obvious targets 
¾ Deep knowledge across disciplines, not narrow expertise 
¾ Imagination, creativity, not replay of prior victories 
¾ Instant information and analysis, not meet next week 
¾ Pernicious insiders, not foreign armies 
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Security, Secrecy and Science 
 
 Another major concern is the growth of secrecy and its impact for both 
science and security. 
 
           The system of science knowledge is based on evidence that must be 
tested and confirmed by others.  To succeed, all scientists must share data, 
methods and materials.  The free exchange of ideas is the indispensable 
prerequisite that makes science grow and prosper.  In recent years our focus on 
commercial profits for faculty and universities – and now security concerns – may 
be stifling and eroding the quality of our scientific enterprise, and it may 
eventually dismantle the integrity that ensures quality and leadership.  Unless we 
maintain leadership, we will ultimately decrease our security. 
 
This is the major conundrum for science and for universities:  
 
¾ The free exchange of information and ideas is an essential element of 
scientific research and university effectiveness. 
¾ Access to information is essential for the democratic process to function 
and succeed. 
¾ Information about key defense technologies can gravely compromise 
security. 
¾ Current homeland security plans could handcuff U.S. science. 
-- adapted from H. Kelly 
 
 Currently, the FBI and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
must frequently screen the research in technology areas, because there will be 
some instances of potential risk.  They classify it as secret when the risk 
warrants, but limit excesses of secrecy.  The Council of Scientific Society 
Presidents suggests that fundamental science should remain >99.9% open with 
a very small percentage of restrictions.  Senior scientists can evaluate research 
in progress at any institution and determine security risks.  Journal editors and 
reviewers are the second line of defense. 
 
 We need to restructure how the U.S. computer-technology research 
system obtains, evaluates and utilizes all future relevant information.  This 
requires three developments that are needed now: 
 
1. A system of much faster computers and searching that ties together all the 
relevant databases in the world, even the ones that do not at first appear 
to be directly useful for such research. 
2. New online knowledge management processes that intelligently store, 
retrieve and mine data, and discover and report continuously to the user 
not only answers to predefined questions, but all new and unique patterns, 
having remotely scanned thousands of databases in minutes.  Such a 
high-IQ next generation search engine can be jointly developed with 
university artificial intelligence labs or appropriate software companies. 
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3. Upgrading all our global GIS systems to provide a fully analyzed 24/7 real 
time surveillance of pre-defined risks from space while coordinating novel 
undisclosed networks of highly sensitive new ground sensors that can 
track in real time a variety of inputs (whatever is needed) whenever it is 
needed. Oversight of this activity is needed. 
 
 Tens of thousands of documents freely available on the world wide web in 
2001 have been removed, and the library files and CD collections confiscated 
and destroyed.  The FBI follows-up to ensure that libraries comply with this order 
to destroy data, and under the law there is no appeal.  Such actions are certain 
to hamper Counter-Terror efforts severely. 
 
The Need for More Agility and Perpetual Learning Systems:  SWAT Team Model 
 
The Council of Scientific Society proposes a Counter-Network SWAT 
Team model: 
 
1. The necessary process is not a moral crusade, and the enemies should 
not be called “terrorists” (that term gives them power over us – to turn us 
into “fearful victims”).  The process should focus on simultaneously 
preventing harm from and eliminating a specific target that we could call 
“networks of fanatic murderers.” 
2. The countervailing force includes organized networks of teams that create 
and develop Scientifically Weighted and Analyzed Tactics (“SWAT-
Teams”) 
3. CSSP SWAT team networks are each composed of leading Ph.D. 
scientists with degrees and expertise in dozens of science disciplines 
(e.g.: chemistry, forensics, risk analysis, psychology, geology, toxicology, 
optics, operations research, computer science, acoustics, physiology, 
meteorology, mathematics, microbiology, physics, etc.) who collaborate 
via a secure Internet. 
4. SWAT teams will each start with a modus operandi and an agenda of 
topics that will provide firm initial guidance, but these teams will then each 
evolve independently. 
5. CSSP SWAT teams use a systems approach – define a whole system; 
discover and rank the importance of its vulnerabilities; and determine the 
optimal deterrence, threat-reduction, vigilance and mitigation processes. 
6. SWAT team scientists are verifiably successful in applying these 
processes – discovering/defining problems, finding patterns and 
analogies, creative brainstorming, hypothesizing testable explanation, 
investigating logically and systematically, reasoning both deductively and 
inductively, critically evaluating, making effective decisions, transferring 
understanding to new situations. 
7. SWAT teams each select several special additional members who serve 
as confidential 2-way information conduits – and buffers – that ensure the 
identities of the SWAT team participants are protected: one each from the 
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FBI, CIA, DTRA, and the homeland security agency.  Each of the four 
special members will provide their SWAT team a modest budget.  These 
four serve as the regular liaison to all other federal agencies (and other 
relevant groups).  The team may add leaders of relevant industrial 
organizations. 
 
What are Some Advantages of the SWAT Team Strategy? 
 
 CSSP SWAT teams should ideally be able to develop the following 
attributes that could develop routine superiority.  They would represent a unique 
part-time “National Guard” – a strategy team whose membership is based only 
on high intellectual competence and advanced knowledge. 
 
¾ They are always fully dispersed and live and travel independently. 
¾ They set their own goals and pace. 
¾ They are always on a rapid learning curve. 
¾ Their leadership can rotate perpetually and randomly. 
¾ They can have hundreds of independent and highly sophisticated 
“antennae.” 
¾ They stay hard to identify since no two teams start or evolve identically. 
¾ Each team can grow and reproduce by division. 
¾ More than one team can deploy against any one threat or vice-versa. 
¾ Each team may create unique tactics whose sum exceeds the potential 
and learning rate of their target network of fanatic murderers. 
¾ Based on science underway in their large community of scientists every 
day, they can discard today’s best solutions and create better ones 
overnight. 
 
Security Questions We Need to Answer  
 
A.  U.S. Food System Security 
 
Why should this be a model?  It was designed to be expedient, not 
impregnable.  It represents $1.3 trillion of the GDP.  There are many sites of 
vulnerability to chemical-bioweapons.   
 
These are the questions we should ask: 
 
1.  What does the quantitative 4-D dynamic model of the whole U.S. food 
system look like? 
 
¾ Where are all the vulnerability points in the system? 
¾ What are the quantitative relative risks and consequences of attacks? 
¾ What new procedures or materiel can erase or circumvent these 
vulnerabilities? 
  24 
¾ What are the costs vs. benefits of various strategic interventions that 
prevent attack? 
¾ How to best protect each target type/location? 
¾ Which are the earliest and best threat indicators? 
 
2. Response preparation:  What we need to know now 
 
¾ How to manage responses to overwhelming surges of activity? 
¾ When/how will we know we are under bio-attack? 
¾ What new biosensor systems can identify a bio-agent with certainty in 
minutes? 
¾ How ready is our USDA extension network to define risks and spot key 
events? 
¾ Consequence management – What processes? People? 
¾ Shortest search process to find and nullify those who caused the 
damage? 
¾ Deter and prevent – best use of current resources? 
 
B. One Subset of Food Security:  High-Consequence Pathogen/Toxin Security 
 
1. The issues, questions, and practical threat reduction: 
– modified from Salerno (personal communication) 
 
¾ Pathogens at restricted laboratory facilities exist in nature and can be 
obtained from many, even hundreds of laboratories around the world. 
¾ The absolute amount of any given organism in an active biological or 
medical research facility cannot be reliably quantified from day to day. 
¾ A strategically significant quantity of pathogenic material can be obtained 
from a single cell because it can be easily cultured with commercially 
available equipment. 
¾ Smugglings of high consequence pathogens are not identified by current 
Customs procedures, technology, or Infectious Agent Laboratory 
practices. 
 
2. What is a high-consequence pathogen/toxin?  What is critical high 
consequence pathogen (HCP) information? 
 
¾ What are the scenarios of an inappropriate HCP acquisition? 
¾ What and how much can be known, how far in advance of a damaging 
prerelease event? 
¾ What are the possible routes of transport and smuggling of each HCP?  
¾ What alters and what happens to each agent after release (terrain-specific 
scenarios)? 
¾ What terrestrial and atmospheric dynamics alter the level of hazard after 
release? 
¾ What are the high consequence target scenarios? 
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¾ What are the most cost-effective damage-preventing changes in each of 
the points of bio-agent vulnerability in the U.S. food system that can be 
made this year? In each of the next three years? 
¾ What number of expert personnel can provide definitive answers for these 
questions during 2002? 
¾ What R&D can be defined in advance to aim at needed answers to these 
questions? 
¾ What fundamental research areas need enhancement to ensure our world 
leadership with knowledge about human/plant/animal pathogens and 
pathogenesis? 
¾ What types of research should be reported, and what agency should have 
oversight responsibility? 
¾ How should we define HCP information that should be protected?   
(e.g: formulas and processes for weaponizing pathogens; formulas and 
processes for creating new lethal organisms.) 
¾ What is the best monitoring system for locations that store, use, and/or 
transport high-consequence pathogens and toxins for organisms; 
individuals; research? 
¾ Who would try to steal or divert a HCP? How could they succeed? 
¾ What vulnerabilities exist at every specific relevant facility or system? 
¾ What technologies, policies, and procedures will reduce risk to a very low 
level? 
 
 
Restrictions and delays should not impede quality research. Threat 
assessment should drive security system design, and insiders must be 
considered part of the risk. 
 
We see that we need a very different set of people, tactics and actions to 
prevent an event than to mitigate damage from a malicious event that has just 
occurred – which seems to be most of our focus so far in Washington. 
 
A recent survey by Research!America showed that 9/10 of the people 
across America believe it is extremely or very important  to have scientific 
research help prepare for and respond to biological and chemical terrorism in the 
United States.  
 
This is our time to lead. We can do it best by thinking big, being bold, and 
thinking out of the box. 
